This article deals with the liability of the supervisory authority of the financial market. It could be questioned whether the supervisory authority, as the public authority, is liable for the supervisory performance. If the answer is yes, then the question is what kind of liability could be found and if any special conditions (prerequisites) are needed. In general, there could be two lines of public liability found. One is systemic liability for the safe financial market—e.g., financial market stability. The other perspective is individual liability for damages caused by unlawful administrative procedure or maladministration, where unlimited strict liability is granted. This kind of liability might be widely questioned, especially when the central bank is the supervisory authority, like in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and other EU member states. This article aims to evaluate the liability of the supervisory authority in the Czech Republic and Hungary concerning the European level of such liability.

Green fintech merges sustainable finance with data-intensive innovation, but national translations of EU rules can create regulatory risk. This study examines how such risk manifests in Central Europe and which policy tools mitigate it. We develop a three-dimension framework—regulatory clarity and scope, supervisory consistency, and innovation facilitation—and apply a comparative qualitative design to Hungary, Slovakia, Czechia, and Poland. Using a common EU baseline, we compile coded national snapshots from primary legal texts, supervisory documents, and recent scholarship. Results show material cross-country variation in labelling practice, soft-law use, and testing infrastructure: Hungary combines central-bank green programmes with an innovation hub/sandbox; Slovakia aligns with ESMA and runs hub/sandbox, though the green-fintech pipeline is nascent; Czechia applies a principles-based safe harbour and lacks a national sandbox; and Poland relies on a virtual sandbox and binding interpretations with limited soft law. These choices shape approval timelines, retail penetration, and cross-border portability of green-labelled products. We conclude with a policy toolkit: labelling convergence or explicit safe harbours, a cross-border sandbox federation, ESRS/ESAP-ready proportionate disclosures, consolidation of recurring interpretations into soft law, investment in suptech for green-claims analytics, and inclusion metrics in sandbox selection.