The research article offers a comparative analysis of the legislative frameworks governing the appointment of heads of autonomous central public administration entities in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The relevance of the subject matter lies at the intersection of administrative law and public governance, addressing the critical question of how legal provisions shape the institutional autonomy and professionalism of state bodies. Although the three countries share common historical and regional characteristics, the study reveals significant differences in the legal regulation and practical execution of appointments. The central thesis posits that legal frameworks alone are insufficient to guarantee institutional independence if political discretion and informal practices undermine transparency and merit-based selection. The research aims to evaluate the degree of formal autonomy, the safeguards against politicisation, and the effectiveness of legal norms in ensuring im partiality. The originality of the research stems from its interdisciplinary and comparative approach, integrating doctrinal legal analysis with an examination of administrative realities. While the scope of the study is national, its relevance extends across Central Europe and the broader EU context. The findings contribute meaningfully to ongoing academic and policy debates on good governance, rule of law, and institutional integrity in public administration.