The societal effects of cybersecurity are widely discussed, but it remains less clear how software security regulations specifically contribute to building a resilient society, particularly in relation to Sustainable Development Goals 5 (Gender Equality), 10 (Reduced Inequalities), and 16 (Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions). This study investigates this connection by examining key EU and U.S. strategies through comparative legal analysis, software development (SDLC) case studies, and a normative–sociological lens. Our findings reveal that major regulations—such as the EU’s Cyber Resilience Act and the U.S. SBOM rules—are not merely reactive, but proactively embed resilience as a fundamental mode of operation. This approach structurally reallocates digital risks from users to manufacturers, reframing software security from a matter of compliance to one of social fairness and institutional trust. We conclude that integrating ‘resilience by design’ into technology rules is more than a technical fix; it is a mechanism that makes digital access fairer and better protects vulnerable populations, enabling technology and society to advance cohesively.

Public trust is essential for credible and consistent state security policy, defense operations, and communications. In the twenty-first cen-tury, the social context of security has expanded significantly, necessitating that society acquire credible and up-to-date security knowledge. This arti-cle examines the relationship between the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and national security actors within the rule-of-law frame-work, focusing on how the trust factor influences goal fulfilment. The study uses a normative analysis of sustainable development goals, emphasizing the social pillar and its connections to national security institutions. It high-lights the importance of continuous, trust-based communication between the public and social partners, reflecting transparency and accountability. The integration of sustainability into national security strategies—particu-larly concerning climate change and energy security—is explored through the strategies of NATO member states. The article also discusses the mu-tual reinforcement between social stability, economic stability, and na-tional security, emphasizing that achieving the SDGs enhances national se-curity, and vice versa. This comprehensive approach fosters effective, long-term solutions by integrating the SDGs into the national security frame-work, ultimately promoting social trust and stability.

This study provides a structured comparative analysis of how democratic and authoritarian regimes integrate cybersecurity into their national security architectures, with particular attention to the severely under-researched Central-Eastern European EU member states (Hungary and Slovakia). Using a most-different-systems design, the article contrasts the multi-stakeholder, cooperative model of a major rule-of-law democracy (United States) with the centralized, digital-sovereignty-driven approaches of three major authoritarian powers (China, Russia, Iran) and two smaller EU members. In addition to institutional structures and oversight mechanisms, the analysis explicitly incorporates public trust dynamics as a critical variable of cybersecurity resilience. Findings show that democratic systems generate higher legitimacy but slower operational tempo, whereas authoritarian models achieve rapid capability integration at the expense of societal trust and private-sector autonomy. In the Central-Eastern European cases, the interplay of NIS2 obligations and pronounced centralizing tendencies produces distinctive governance patterns that deviate from both the classic “cooperating cyberfare state” and the “smart total-control” archetypes. The study demonstrates that sustained public trust—fostered through transparent communication, accountable institutions and meaningful societal inclusion—acts as a force multiplier for cybersecurity resilience across all regime types. By filling three identified gaps (small EU member states, cross-regime empirical depth, and public-trust integration), the article advances both the comparative politics of cybersecurity governance and practical policy recommendations for strengthening transatlantic and intra-EU cyber resilience.