A significant majority of engineering professionals think that the technical and technological achievements of the fourth industrial revolution can provide an appropriate framework for the realisation of road transport based on autonomous mobility, assuming that a suitable legal, social and infrastructural background is ensured. Artificial intelligence (AI), the technological prerequisite of autonomous mobility, along with robotics and the Internet of Things (IoT) will result in a paradigm shift in many fields of our life and of the economy (Ződi 2018), and will reshape our current idea on road transport. Autonomous mobility based on artificial intelligence will have many benefits. For example, it will promote mobility of elderly or ill people, or people who are unable or have a limited ability to drive. Environmental pollution will be reduced, cities will be more liveable, the expected economic growth and other resultant economic advantages will be significant, and the efficiency of transport will be improved. Among the benefits, the considerable improvement of road safety will be of special importance. The European Union aspires to play a globally-leading role in the introduction of connected and automated mobility, in order to realise the ambitious goal set in the White Paper of 2011 (the Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area), in particular to halve the number of road fatalities in the European Union by 2030 and to reach zero fatalities by 2050. The elimination of human errors such as driving without due care and attention, driving under the influence of alcohol or other drugs etc., which account for 93-94% of road accidents require the realisation of autonomous mobility powered by artificial intelligence.

The paper analyses the nature of enforcement within the censorial regimen morum (CRM) in Ancient Rome by taking into consideration various Latin legal and literary sources. It comes to the conclusion that CRM could be seen as a transitional institution in a system which evolved from a formerly domaninant collective or decentralized to a more centralized enforcement. It also enriches the debate on the concept of law through historical insights by claiming that a social order can meaningfully called a legal order only if centralized production and enforcement of norms had been already added to the consensus of some commonly shared values.

This chapter is intended to be a critical discussion of the interpretations of human dignity, as well as their changes, relevant for constitutional law in Hungary. The Fundamental Law of Hungary, in force since 1 January 2012, is characterized by a continuation of the previous constitutional situation but also by a departure from it. This is the reason why the analysis covers both the previous Constitution and the related jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court as well as the new Fundamental Law and its interpretation by the Court, in order to give a picture of the situation of human dignity in Hungary. In addition to a mere description, part of the survey will be devoted to the critical assessment of the situation. Thus, readers approaching the problem from a comparative perspective will not only find an overview of the legal text per se (law in books) and its interpretation (law in action) but may also learn about the views of some exponents of Hungarian legal scholarship.

It is a common belief that democratic development involves the extension of rights. Often, a desired extension of rights is one of the main social drivers of democratic transformation. In this study, within the framework of a legal history investigation, I am looking for the answer to the question of whether all extensions of rights are necessarily democratic, and how to distinguish between different extensions of rights and to judge the social usefulness of each extension of rights more accurately? I distinguish two sub-cases of the extension of rights, the subjective and objective versions with different normative consequences. I conclude that it is worth subjecting certain extensions of rights to legal, constitutional and political-social considerations. The extension of rights is not ab ovo or absolutely good, its judgment depends on the given circumstances.